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Abstract
In recent years, many proposals have arisen from research on privacy in
smart metering. One of the considered approaches is anonymization: smart
meters transmit fine-grained electricity consumption values in such a way
that the energy supplier can not exactly determine procedence. This paper
measures the real privacy provided by such approach by taking into account
that at the end of a billing period the energy supplier collects the overall
electricity consumption of each meter for billing purposes. An entropy-based
measure is proposed for quantifying privacy and determine the extent to
which knowledge on the overall consumption of meters allows to re-identify
anonymous fine-grained consumption values.
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1. Introduction
Smart meters measure and transmit information about electricity con-
sumption to the energy supplier in short intervals (each 15 or 30 minutes).
Such data allows an accurate prediction of consumption so that the produc-
tion can be managed in real-time. The replacement of old analog meters
with smart ones is in progress in many developed countries. For instance,
the European Union expects to replace 80% of electricity meters by 2020.
In Spain, such deployment was almost complete by the end of 2018.
Unfortunately, such fine-grained data about household electricity con-
sumption allows to infer sensitive information like the types of electrical
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devices being used, or even the exact times people leave or arrive at home.
Encryption of electricity readings prior to their transmission protects
against external eavesdroppers but not against a malicious energy supplier
which may process them for non-authorized purposes. Hence, privacy-
preserving solutions for smart metering data transmission should assume
that the energy supplier is an untrusted entity.
Solutions providing privacy in smart metering can be classified into the
following main classes:
• Obfuscation-based methods: Controllable batteries and alternative gen-
eration devices [16], or devices with an adjustable consumption [8] are
placed inside the household so as to alter energy usage curves.
• Perturbative methods: Meters mask a fine-grained electricity consump-
tion value by adding some random noise to it prior to its transmission
to the energy supplier. In this way, the energy supplier gets only an
approximation to the real household consumption profiles. The type
and magnitude of the added noise has to be accurately tuned to en-
force privacy while preserving the accuracy of the transmitted data.
The proposal [1] provides differential privacy [6] by LaPlacian noise
addition. The proposal [2] is based on adding Gaussian noise.
• Anonymous methods: Data are transmitted so that the link between
electricity readings and the identity of customers is removed. The
proposals [7, 9] propose the use of pseudonyms for sending high fre-
quency metering data. In the aforementioned proposals each house-
hold has a unique pseudonym which is transmitted together with all
its consumption values so that the electricity providers are able to get
anonymous consumption patterns (linked to pseudonyms). In [13] it
is proven that pseudonymized consumption traces can be re-identified
if combined with external indicators. The authors show the high re-
identification performance of two attack vectors called anomaly de-
tection and behavior pattern matching. Both attacks are shown to
be robust against basic countermeasures like resolution reduction or
frequent re-pseudonymization.
A different approach is taken in [20, 24]. In these proposals, the elec-
tricity consumptions received by the electricity supplier at a given pe-
riod come without a pseudonym [20] or linked to a pseudonym shared
among several meters [24]. In this way, a given consumption value
could come from any meter belonging to the originating community.
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• Aggregation-based methods: The meters are grouped into neighbor-
hoods or communities with a substation which has direct communi-
cation with each meter. Each metering period, the meters and the
substation engage in a protocol which results in the substation receiv-
ing the aggregated (added) readings of all the meters. Such propos-
als employ homomorphic cryptosystems for ensuring the substation
gets no information but the addition of all meters readings in a me-
tering period. This problem, when not focused on smart metering
data, is referred to as privacy-preserving aggregation of time-series
data [14, 22, 23].
The authors in [10] consider a neighborhood with n smart meters,
sm1, . . . , smn and a substation. Each meter stores a private key whose
related public key is publicly known. Each meter takes its energy
consumption ei at a given period and generates n values mi,j, j ∈
{1, . . . , n}, satisfying ei = mi,1 + . . .+mi,n. Then each meter smi en-
crypts each valuemi,j, j 6= i under the public key of smj and transmits
the resulting ciphertext to the substation. The substation homomor-
phically aggregates all n − 1 ciphertexts encrypted under the public
key of each meter and sends the result to it. Each meter smi, decrypts
the received ciphertext and adds mii to it. Finally, it sends the result
to the substation. The substation gets the aggregated consumption as
the addition of the results received from all the meters. The proposal
has a high, O(n2), communication cost per execution.
The authors in [22] suggest a method which can be applied to aggre-
gate smart meter readings. There exists a neighborhood public key
whose private key is distributed among all the meters. Each meter in
a neighborhood encrypts its consumption value using the Paillier cryp-
tosystem under the neighborhood public key. The substation aggre-
gates all the encrypted consumptions and then requests each meter to
compute a partial decryption of the resulting ciphertext. From all the
partial decryptions, the substation obtains the aggregated consump-
tion. The proposal includes a method to prevent a malicious coalition
including the substation and some corrupted meters from getting in-
formation about the consumption of honest meters other than their
aggregated sum. The authors also include a way to add LaPlacian
noise to the consumptions so as to get differential privacy. A draw-
back of this proposal comes from the use of a distributed Paillier cryp-
tosystem whose setup is very complicated when a trusted dealer is not
desirable [19]. The proposal [4], enhanced in [11], proposes a similar
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aggregation mechanism which makes use of the homomorphic property
of ElGamal cryptosystem with a quite easier distributed private key
setup.
The proposals [23, 27] require the presence of a trusted dealer that
generates a set of random values that sum up to zero. As pointed out
in [15], and implemented in [12], presence of a trusted dealer during
setup can be avoided by making use of a trusted dealer–free protocol
for secure addition like [10, 22, 18]. Each meter and the substation
receive one of such values. Each meter uses its secret share to en-
crypt its reading prior to transmitting it. The substation aggregates
the received encrypted data and gets the addition of all the read-
ings after solving an easy instance of the discrete logarithm problem.
The authors in [23] extend their basic proposal to provide differential
privacy by adding symmetric geometric noise. The proposal is very
lightweight and only requires unidirectional meter to substation data
transmission. Unfortunately, in dynamic scenarios, each time a meter
is added or removed, the presence of a trusted dealer or execution of a
trusted dealer–free protocol for secure addition is required. A similar
proposal which avoids the computation of a discrete logarithm after
decryption at the cost of requiring a trusted dealer that generates an
RSA modulus N = pq, is proposed in [14]. A proposal equivalent
to [14] can be found in [3].
The Germany’s information security agency has designed a smart me-
tering system architecture which considers the privacy of consumers. The
solution belongs to the anonymous methods paradigm. As discussed in [24],
the key component of that architecture is a smart metering gateway which
is installed in a consumer’s house. The main tasks of a gateway are to get
local meters readings and communicate remotely with the energy service
provider and the grid operator. Remote communications can be identifiable
or pseudonymised.
Identifiable communications are used for transmitting the sum of elec-
tricity consumption values (e.g., once per month) to the service provider for
billing purposes. Pseudonymised communications are for privately sending
fine-grained electricity consumption values. First, the gateway generates a
message composed of the consumption value together with a pseudonym.
That message is encrypted under the grid operator’s public key. Next, the
resulting ciphertext is digitally signed and transmitted to a gateway operator
which verifies the digital signature, removes it, and forwards the encrypted
message to the grid operator. The grid operator finally decrypts the received
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message and gets the consumption value together with the pseudonym. So
as to keep the source of data secret, a given pseudonym must be shared
among a certain amount of gateways. A pseudonym shared among k gate-
ways is assumed to provide k-anonymity since a dishonest grid operator can
not determine which of the k gateways sharing a pseudonym is the source
of a given consumption value.
2. Problem statement
As detailed in the model [2], a smart metering application consists of an
electricity supplier (ES) and a set of smart meters S = {sm1, . . . , smn}. Let
ei,j be the electricity consumption measured by smi in period j. We denote
by t the number of time periods included in a billing period. In a scenario
in which consumption values are sent sharing the same pseudonym, at the
end of a given billing period, the information collected by the ES is:
• For each meter smi, the sum of its electricity consumption values over
the billing period. That is, Ei =
∑t
j=1 ei,j.
• For each period j, the set of pseudonymized electricity consumption
values transmitted by all the meters in S. We denote these values as
{e′1,j , . . . , e
′
n,j}. Note that there exists a permutation pij, unknown to
the ES, so that ei,j = e
′
pij(i),j
.
The privacy of customers is preserved as long as each permutation pij
stays secret. Hence, the objective of a malicious ES aiming to get infor-
mation about the consumption habits of a given meter sm1 is to determine
pij(1) for each time period j ∈ {1, . . . , t}, so that the consumption values of
sm1 can be reidentified as {e1,1, . . . , e1,t} = {e
′
pi1(1),1
, . . . , e′
pit(1),t
}.
2.1. Example
Let us assume a smart metering application composed of three smart
meters {sm1, sm2, sm3} and a billing period composed of nine time periods.
The aggregated consumptions of the meters are E1 = 991, E2 = 473 and
E3 = 926. The pseudonymized consumption values are shown in Table 1.
Now the ES can search for sets of three-element permutations {pi1, . . . , pi9}
satisfying that
∑9
j=1 e
′
pij(1),j
= 991,
∑9
j=1 e
′
pij(2),j
= 473, and
∑9
j=1 e
′
pij(3),j
=
926. There exist three such solutions shown in Table 2.
All the three possible solutions satisfy that pi1(1) = 3, hence the ES
can deduce that e1,1 = 362. In the same way, the ES also deduces that
e1,5 = 140, e1,6 = 36, and e1,8 = 83, so that the consumption of sm1 at
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Period Consumptions
1 {117, 104, 362}
2 {89, 50, 64}
3 {25, 119, 86}
4 {23, 25, 149}
5 {86, 140, 49}
6 {36, 87, 117}
7 {42, 146, 108}
8 {24, 83, 92}
9 {56, 24, 87}
Table 1: Pseudonymized consumptions (in Wh).
362 + 64 + 119 + 23 + 140 + 36 + 108 + 83 + 56 = 991,
117 + 50 + 25 + 25 + 49 + 117 + 42 + 24 + 24 = 473,
104 + 89 + 86 + 149 + 86 + 87 + 146 + 92 + 87 = 926.
362 + 64 + 86 + 25 + 140 + 36 + 108 + 83 + 87 = 991,
117 + 50 + 25 + 23 + 49 + 87 + 42 + 24 + 56 = 473,
104 + 89 + 119 + 149 + 86 + 117 + 146 + 92 + 24 = 926.
362 + 89 + 86 + 25 + 140 + 36 + 146 + 83 + 24 = 991,
117 + 50 + 25 + 23 + 49 + 87 + 42 + 24 + 56 = 473,
104 + 64 + 119 + 149 + 86 + 117 + 108 + 92 + 87 = 926.
Table 2: Solutions to the problem.
four periods is revealed. Regarding sm2, the ES can exactly determine six
consumption values, namely e2,1 = 117, e2,2 = 50, e2,3 = 25, e2,5 = 49,
e2,7 = 42, and e2,8 = 24. For sm3, the ES can infer e3,1 = 104, e3,4 = 149,
e3,5 = 86, and e3,8 = 92. Hence, partial information about the consumption
habits of the three smart meters actually leaked.
This example shows that a smart metering application composed of k
smart meters sharing the same pseudonym can not guarantee to achieve
k-anonymity.
2.2. Relaxed problem statement
Let a smart metering application with n meters with a billing period
composed of t periods. For each period j there exist n! possible n-element
permutations. Hence the search space for the previous problem is (n!)t. This
makes the problem solvable through exhaustive search only for instances
with very small values of n and t. In our experiments, even a dynamic
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programming optimized implementation of the problem has failed to provide
reasonable running times.
We consider a relaxed version of the problem in which the ES focuses
on just one of the meters, for instance sm1. Now, for each time period j,
the ES will reduce its search to sets of integers {pi1(1), . . . , pi9(1)} satisfying
that
∑9
j=1 e
′
pij(1),j
= E1.
In this case, for each period j, there exist n possible values for pij(1)
and the search space becomes nt. Although the search space keeps being
exponential, the problem aiming to find one of such solutions corresponds
to an instance of the multiple-choice subset-sum problem (MCSSP) which,
as stated in [21], can be solved in polynomial time when the weights and
profits (in our case the consumption values) are bounded by a constant.
In our case, we need to find all such solutions, but dynamic programming
techniques allow us to efficiently solve even moderately large instances of
the problem.
2.3. Measuring privacy
As said before, in a smart metering application with n meters and t
time periods, the objective of an attacker aiming to compromise the privacy
of sm1 is to determine pij(1) for each period j ∈ {1, . . . , t}. From the at-
tacker point of view, each pij(1) is a random variable whose sample space is
{1, . . . , n}.
When the attacker is able to exactly determine pij(1), then the entropy
(uncertainty) on pij(1) is 0 bits. On the other side, when it has no infor-
mation at all about it, since there are n possible values for pij(1), then its
entropy is log2 n bits. An attacker with partial information about plausible
values for pij(1) will get an entropy ranging between 0 and log2 n.
2.4. Our approach
In our approach, we search for all the solutions {pi1(1), . . . , pi9(1)} satis-
fying
∑9
j=1 e
′
pij(1),j
= E1. Then, for each pij , we count the amount of times
that each value from its range (1, . . . , n) appears in a solution. Finally, we
assign a probability to each solution which is proportional to its appearance
rate, and compute the entropy of random variable pij.
2.5. Example
In our example, in its reduced version focused on meter sm1, an attacker
finds twenty-two solutions to the problem, which are shown in Table 3.
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362 + 64 + 119 + 23 + 140 + 36 + 108 + 83 + 56 = 991
117 + 64 + 119 + 149 + 140 + 117 + 146 + 83 + 56 = 991
362 + 64 + 119 + 25 + 49 + 87 + 146 + 83 + 56 = 991
362 + 64 + 25 + 149 + 86 + 117 + 108 + 24 + 56 = 991
362 + 50 + 119 + 149 + 49 + 36 + 146 + 24 + 56 = 991
362 + 89 + 86 + 25 + 86 + 117 + 146 + 24 + 56 = 991
362 + 89 + 86 + 25 + 86 + 87 + 108 + 92 + 56 = 991
362 + 89 + 25 + 149 + 140 + 36 + 42 + 92 + 56 = 991
362 + 50 + 86 + 23 + 140 + 36 + 146 + 92 + 56 = 991
362 + 64 + 25 + 149 + 140 + 36 + 108 + 83 + 24 = 991
362 + 89 + 86 + 25 + 140 + 36 + 146 + 83 + 24 = 991
362 + 64 + 86 + 23 + 86 + 117 + 146 + 83 + 24 = 991
362 + 64 + 119 + 25 + 140 + 87 + 146 + 24 + 24 = 991
362 + 64 + 86 + 149 + 49 + 87 + 146 + 24 + 24 = 991
362 + 89 + 119 + 23 + 49 + 87 + 146 + 92 + 24 = 991
362 + 50 + 119 + 25 + 86 + 87 + 146 + 92 + 24 = 991
362 + 64 + 86 + 25 + 140 + 36 + 108 + 83 + 87 = 991
362 + 64 + 119 + 149 + 49 + 36 + 42 + 83 + 87 = 991
362 + 89 + 25 + 23 + 140 + 36 + 146 + 83 + 87 = 991
362 + 64 + 119 + 23 + 49 + 117 + 146 + 24 + 87 = 991
362 + 89 + 25 + 25 + 86 + 117 + 108 + 92 + 87 = 991
362 + 64 + 119 + 23 + 49 + 87 + 108 + 92 + 87 = 991
Table 3: Solutions to the relaxed problem.
From these results, we estimate that the probability P [pi1(1) = 3] (which
implies e1,1 = 362) is 21/22, while P [pi1(1) = 1] (with e1,1 = 117) is 1/22.
In this case, the entropy on pi1(1) is as low as 0.2668 bits.
A higher entropy is obtained for pi4(1). In that case, P [pi4(1) = 1] is
7/22, P [pi4(1) = 2] is 8/22, and P [pi4(1) = 3] is 7/22. In this case, the
entropy we get on pi4(1) is maximum, namely 1.582 bits.
3. Experimental results
This section shows the results obtained from several experiments over
real and synthetic data.
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3.1. Experiments over real data
In our experiments we have used data from the set “Electricity Smart Me-
ter CBT” kindly provided by the Irish Social Science Data Archive (ISSDA)1.
That data set contains data collected from several houselholds in 30 minute
intervals. Electricity readings are provided in kWh with three decimal pre-
cision, which is equivalent to providing them in Wh.
In order to evaluate the privacy obtained for different group sizes and
amount of time periods we have first filtered the data set. The provided file
contains the readings of 1000 smart meters during about 25000 time periods.
For each experiment, we have selected a random subset of n smart meters
S = {sm1, . . . , smn}, and t consecutive time periods.
We generated several problem instances with n ∈ {2, 4, 8, 16} and t ∈
{15, 30, 60}. For each instance, we ran our solver so as to find all the solu-
tions focusing on the first smart meter sm1. Then, we computed the entropy
at each time period.
n = 2 n = 4 n = 8 n = 16
Max. entropy 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00
t = 15 0.20 1.93 2.97 3.33
t = 30 0.99 1.71 2.68 4.00
t = 60 0.85 1.42 2.75 3.64
Table 4: Average entropy for experiments over real data.
Table 4 summarizes the results obtained from these experiments. Each
column corresponds to a value for n. The first row shows the maximum
obtainable entropy for each n, namely log2 n bits. The rest of the rows
correspond to different values for t.
As it can be seen, a maximum (or almost maximum) entropy is reached
in some problem instances, but, in general, the result is about 0.5 bits below.
Regarding the influence of the amount of time periods, t, it seems that
this parameter has little influence on the results. In some cases, the highest
entropy has been obtained for t = 15, while others required t = 30. Notice
that for n = 8, t = 60 provides a result better than t = 30 (although in that
case t = 15 was the best).
Other problem instances were analyzed with similar results. Due to the
nature of this data set, it is difficult to extract precise conclusions.
1https://www.ucd.ie/issda/
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Solving instances with very large values for n and t is very difficult due
to the high requirements both in time and space. Hence it may be possible
that the adversary is even unable to obtain a set of possible solutions.
3.2. Experiments over synthetic data
We next detail several experiments conducted over synthetic data. So as
to generate synthetic data sets we first inferred the probability distribution
of the smart meter readings.
We analyzed the data from a single meter so as to estimate the parame-
ters for several possible distributions. When possible, we used the uniformly
minimum-variance unbiased estimators (UMVUE) [25, 17]. Then, we used
Crame´r-von Mises criterion [5, 26] to evaluate the goodness of fit of each of
the considered distributions. We repeated this process with data from other
smart meters to verify the consistency of results.
Our conclusion was that, in general, smart meter readings follow an
exponential distribution (although for some meters the Crame´r-von Mises
criterion pointed more to a normal distribution).
Thus, we created our synthetic problem instances as follows: The first
smart meter (the one we are trying to identify) follows an exponential dis-
tribution Exp(λ) with λ−1 being the mean of the distribution. Each of the
remaining n − 1 meters follows an exponential distribution Exp(0.01), so
that their readings have a mean value of 100. Several problem instances
were generated at random under the mentioned distributions.
n = 2 n = 4 n = 8 n = 16 n = 32
t = 15 0.00 0.73 1.73 2.63 3.74
t = 30 0.00 1.31 1.75 2.85 4.10
t = 60 0.43 1.02 1.99 2.97 3.87
Table 5: Average entropy for experiments over synthetic data for λ−1 = 20
n = 2 n = 4 n = 8 n = 16 n = 32
t = 15 0.00 1.54 2.76 3.71 4.66
t = 30 0.62 1.47 2.78 3.73 4.81
t = 60 0.73 1.80 2.85 3.77 4.66
Table 6: Average entropy for experiments over synthetic data for λ−1 = 50
Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 show the results obtained from these new experiments.
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n = 2 n = 4 n = 8 n = 16 n = 32
t = 15 0.97 1.99 3.00 3.99 4.96
t = 30 1.00 1.98 2.99 3.98 4.96
t = 60 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 4.99
Table 7: Average entropy for experiments over synthetic data for λ−1 = 100
n = 2 n = 4 n = 8 n = 16 n = 32
t = 15 0.78 1.61 2.63 3.86 4.27
t = 30 0.85 1.78 2.57 3.75 4.44
t = 60 0.73 1.78 2.81 3.51 4.43
Table 8: Average entropy for experiments over synthetic data for λ−1 = 200
In each table, the data of the first smart meter sm1 was generated under
a different value for λ−1. Parameter λ−1 was 20 in Table 5, 50 in Table 6,
100 in Table 7, 200 in Table 8, and 500 in Table 9.
The results were similar to those obtained from real data from the set
provided by the ISSDA. As before, except for the extreme case with only
n = 2 smart meters, the amount of periods t did not affect very much. It
seems, however, that t = 60 has a larger tendency to produce the highest
entropy, but that was not the case for larger values of λ−1. This is specially
noticeable in Table 9.
The experiments show that the attainable entropy depends on the value
of λ−1. It is higher when the distribution of the targeted meter is close to
that of the remaining meters, and decreases as its distribution differs from
the others.
When λ−1 = 100 (Table 7), which corresponds to the case in which all
the meters follow the same distribution, the highest privacy is obtained, as
a maximum or almost maximum entropy for all combinations of n and t.
When the mean of the targeted meter readings is half of (Table 6, λ−1 =
n = 2 n = 4 n = 8 n = 16 n = 32
t = 15 0.00 1.31 2.20 3.03 3.25
t = 30 0.52 1.22 1.56 2.26 3.00
t = 60 0.52 0.82 1.42 2.47 2.88
Table 9: Average entropy for experiments over synthetic data for λ−1 = 500
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50) or doubles (Table 8, λ−1 = 200) the mean of the others, the highest
attainable entropy is about 0.2 bits below the maximum.
For λ−1 = 20 (Table 5) and λ−1 = 500 (Table 9), the highest attainable
entropy is about 0.5 bits below the maximum for n = 2, but as n increases,
the gap increases to about 1 bit. In the case for n = 32 and λ−1 = 500, the
highest entropy (obtained with t = 15) is 3.25, which is 1.75 bits below the
maximum.
Our experiments allow to conclude that, when defining the household
groups, we should select their size, n, considering the desired level of privacy
and assuming that the entropy will be about 1 bit below the maximum
(log2 n).
The number of time intervals t can not be chosen as it depends on the
billing period, but in general t will tend to take high values (one month
billing periods are quite usual).
4. Conclusion
In this paper an entropy-based measure for quantifying the real pri-
vacy provided by anonymous privacy-preserving smart metering methods
has been proposed. As the underlying problem required for solving the orig-
inal problem statement has shown to be too hard, we have performed several
experiments on a relaxed formulation of it.
The experiments have shown that the attained privacy, measured as
entropy, is about one bit below the theoretical maximum. Privacy increases
when all the electricity readings of the involved meters are similar.
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